We consider dynamic electromagnetic evasion-interrogation games in which the evader can use ferroelectric material coatings to attempt to avoid detection while the interrogator can manipulate the interrogating frequencies to enhance detection. The resulting problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum dynamic differential game in which the cost functional is based on the expected value of the...

We show that the following problem is EXP-complete: given a rational v and a two player, zero-sum Boolean gameG determine whether the value of G is at least v. The proof is via a translation of the proof of the same result for Boolean circuit games in [1]. 1 Preliminaries We will be using the encoding of [2] to replicate the proof of [1]. A familiarity with [2] will make the proof much easier t...

We examine a solution concept, called the “value,” for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player’s position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player’s contribution to the total payoff but also the player’s ability to inflict losses on other players. A salient feature is that the value takes account of the co...

This paper investigates the problem of allocating multiple defensive resources to protect multiple sites against possible attacks by an adversary. The effectiveness of the resources in reducing potential damage to the sites is assumed to vary across the resources and across the sites and their availability is constrained. The problem is formulated as a two-person zero-sum game with piecewise li...

Economists use the word rational in a narrow way. To an economist, a rational actor is someone who makes decisions that maximize her (or his) preferences subject to constraints imposed by the environment. So, this actor knows her preferences and knows how to go about optimizing. It is a powerful approach, but it probably is only distantly related to what you mean when you think of yourself as r...

In future battlefields and other emerging multiagent applications, agents must communicate in an inherently hostile environment in which an adversary has strong incentives to disrupt or intercept communication. Intelligent agents must balance network performance with possible harm suffered from the adversary’s attacks, given that the adversary is actively and rationally balancing his own costs ...

We examine a solution concept, called the “value,” for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player’s position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player’s contribution to the total payoff but also the player’s ability to inflict losses on other players. A salient feature is that the value takes account of the co...

The zero-sum matrix game is one of the most classic game models, and it is widely used in many scientific and engineering fields. In the real world, due to the complexity of the decision-making environment, sometimes the payoffs received by players may be inexact or uncertain, which requires that the model of matrix games has the ability to represent and deal with imprecise payoffs. To meet suc...

We consider a zero-sum stopping game (Dynkin’s game) with a threshold probability criterion in discrete time stochastic processes. We first obtain fundamental characterization of value function of the game and optimal stopping times for both players as the result of the classical Dynkin’s game, but the value function of the game and the optimal stopping time for each player depend upon a thresh...

We apply existing, and develop new, zero-sum game techniques for designing polynomial-time algorithms to compute additive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In particular, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that given an arbitrary bimatrix game as an input, outputs either an additive 1 3 -Nash equilibrium or an additive 1 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium; and we give a polynomial...