We consider agents as a source of welfare for a principal. The principal provides funds, and the benefits produced are known only to the source. If more productive sources are less risk-averse, the principal offers fixed and variable bundles to screen sources. The analysis reveals that the optimal lottery achieves great target efficiency. Indeed, when the ratio of marginal benefits approaches z...

As the dependence structure (i.e. the copula) among the assets is ...xed, one might think that the riskier the assets, the riskier the portfolio. Surprisingly enough, this conjecture turns out to be false even for coherent risk measures and normal returns. We show that two conditions are able to preserve risk ordering under the portfolio: convexity for the risk measure and conditional increasin...

This paper investigates a principal-agent model in which an owner (principal) optimizes a contract with a manager (agent) delegated to undertake an investment project. In the model, we explore the effects of costly exploration by which the manager learns the real value of development cost. We show that high exploration cost can lead to a pooling policy not contingent on project type. Further, a...

We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm-level and country-level co...

Article history: Received 11 May 2012 Received in revised form 17 July 2013 Accepted 8 November 2013 Available online 18 November 2013 Market effects on corporate investment are well documented. Low disagreement implies high investment, but we know little about what high disagreement implies, other than the implied flip side (low investment). This paper adds to this literature in several ways. ...

This paper tests empirically the hypothesis that the greater the intangibility of a firm’s resources, the greater the sustainability of its competitive advantage. Resource intangibility is measured by: (1) Tobin’s q and (2) the predicted value from a hedonic regression of q on several accounting measures of intangibles. Sustainability is measured by the persistence of firm-specific profits. Usi...

This study examines whether firms issue capital expenditure forecasts as a commitment to not engage in expropriation of lenders through opportunistic investment activities. We find that firms with higher leverage and lower credit quality are more likely to issue capital expenditure forecasts and deviate less from the forecasts. Furthermore, for firms that issue capital expenditure forecasts, lo...

In this paper the author proves that the Expected Net Future Value (ENFV) criterion can lead a risk neutral social planner to reject projects that increase expected utility. By contrast, the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) rule correctly identifies the economic value of the project. While the ENFV increases with uncertainty over future interest rates, the expected utility decreases because of...

A multi-divisional firm can engage in ”winner-picking” to redistribute scarce funds efficiently across divisions. But there is a conflict between rewarding winners (investing) and producing resources with which to reward winners (incentives). Managers in winning divisions are tempted to free-ride on resources produced by managers in loosing divisions whose incentives to produce resources, antic...

We examine investment behavior when firms face costs in the access to external funds. We find that despite the existence of liquidity constraints, standard investment regressions predict that cash flow is an important determinant of investment only if one ignores q. Conversely, we also obtain significant cash flow effects even in the absence of financial frictions. These findings provide suppor...