We show that even when the information structure is independent of the state of nature, the value of the n-stage zero-sum game with incomplete information is not necessarily monotonic with respect to the length of the game. More precisely, we give an example of such an n-stage game in which v~>v~<v~.

In this document we provide a couple of exercises that help understand the basic concepts of game theory, including pure and mixed strategies, zero sum and non-zero sum games, and saddle-point and Nash solutions. The definition for concepts and the ideas for these exercises were taken in part from [1, 2]. Before we start, let us introduce some notation. We are going to assume that we have only ...

An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, admits a value. The proof relies on a representation of the game as a stochastic game with perfect information, in which Nature operates as a delegate for the players and performs the randomizations for them.

We prove a generalization of von Neumann’s minmax theorem to the class of separable multiplayer zerosum games, introduced in [Bregman and Fokin 1998]. These games are polymatrix—that is, graphical games in which every edge is a two-player game between its endpoints—in which every outcome has zero total sum of players’ payoffs. Our generalization of the minmax theorem implies convexity of equili...

In this paper, we initiate a study on optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under generalized expectation via backward stochastic differential equations and partial information. We first prove a sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum stochastic differential game problem. And then extend our approach to general stochastic differential games (nonzero–sum games), and obtain ...

We consider a two-player zero-sum game given by a Markov chain over a finite set of states K and a family of zero-sum matrix games (G)k∈K . The sequence of states follows the Markov chain. At the beginning of each stage, only player 1 is informed of the current state k, then the game G is played, the actions played are observed by both players and the play proceeds to the next stage. We call su...

We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where both players control a continuous martingale. A similar representation as a control problem over discontinuous martingales was known for games with incomplete i...

In 1951, Dantzig [3] showed the equivalence of linear programming and two-person zero-sum games. However, in the description of his reduction from linear programming to zero-sum games, he noted that there was one case in which his reduction does not work. This also led to incomplete proofs of the relationship between the Minmax Theorem of game theory and the Strong Duality Theorem of linear pro...