We study the design of optimal unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard and cyclical fluctuations. The optimal unemployment insurance contract balances the insurance motive to provide consumption for the unemployed with the provision of incentives to search for a job. This balance is affected by aggregate conditions, as recessions are characterized by reductions in job finding...

This paper explores the welfare consequences of unemployment insurance when private insurance markets are subject to enforcement frictions that limit debt accumulation, endogenously determining individual borrowing limits as a function of the length of unemployment. Reducing the replacement rate in the model initially increases borrowing, as the value of default declines significantly. As the r...

This paper studies the effect of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility criteria for men above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian private-sector employees, the results of difference-in-difference regressions suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in disability enrollment of 6 to...

An increase in unemployment compensation is commonly argued to raise unemployment in a shirking model of efficiency wages. This prediction is based on the assumption of a uniform benefit level. However, 32q13if differential benefits for shirkers and non-shirkers exist, higher unemployment compensation for non-shirkers will reduce unemployment. In the long-run, this effect is amplified. Therefor...

Introducing Unemployment Insurance to Developing Countries The paper identifies key labor market and institutional differences between developed and developing countries, analyzes how these differences affect the working of the standard, OECD-style unemployment insurance (UI) program, and derives a desirable design of unemployment benefit program in developing countries. It argues that these co...

OBJECTIVE Previous studies suggest that unemployment predicts increased cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk, but whether unemployment insurance programs mitigate this risk has not been assessed. Exploiting US state variations in unemployment insurance benefit programs, we tested the hypothesis that more generous benefits reduce CVD risk. METHODS Cohort data came from 16,108 participants in the ...

This paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on credit markets. Exploiting heterogeneity in the generosity of unemployment insurance across US states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid defaulting on their debt. For every $1,000 increase in maximum UI benefits, mortgage delinquency drops by 2% and the eviction rate drops by 10% among unemployed homeowners....