We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishna’s (2008) model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. When the equilibrium calls for weak bidde...

We estimate a model of ticket resale that incorporates strategic effort choices by consumers and brokers in the primary market, rational anticipation of resale activity, and the resulting resale market equilibrium. Estimation is based on a unique dataset that combines detailed sales data from both the primary and secondary markets for a sample of major rock concerts. We use the estimated model ...

This paper studies auctions held before bidders are sure of the values they place on the object for sale, leaving potential gains to subsequent resale trade. While important insights from models of auctions without resale carry over, equilibrium bidding can be fundamentally altered by the endogeneity of valuations and the informational linkages between primary and secondary markets. As a result...

In this paper, we investigate the model of speculative resale in auctions. Resale (or secondary trade) is allowed for each bidder, but in equilibrium we show that there is only speculative resale. We consider a standard …rst-price auction in the …rst stage with symmetric independent private values (IPV) among N bidders and one speculator. In the second stage there is resale among the bidders. T...

Keeping and weakening only one assumption from Zheng (2002), who constructs an optimal auction with resale, we prove that the sealed-bid second-price auction with resale implements the optimal allocation in Myerson (1981)’s regular case with two bidders. We also construct other optimal mechanisms with resale.

This paper exploits a unique panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms containing information on vertical restraints with retailers and wholesalers. This data reports detailed information on firm distribution systems and the type of vertical restraints that firms impose: Franchise fee, Resale price maintenance, Full-line forcing, Exclusive territories and Exclusive dealing, which is a rather...