Ex. 17 Let us call the new system L, i.e. its axioms are all propositional tautologies (Axiom 1) plus the axioms 2> (Axiom 2) and 2φ∧2ψ → 2(φ∧ψ) (Axiom 3), and the rules modus ponens and φ→ ψ 2φ→ 2ψ We have to show that for all formulas φ `K φ ⇔ `L φ. ⇒: For this direction we have to show that L derives all axioms of K and all its rules. Axiom 1 of K is the same as Axiom 1 in L, thus we have no...

§9.1 The Axiom of Choice We come now to the most important part of set theory for other branches of mathematics. Although infinite set theory is technically the foundation for all mathematics, in practice it is perfectly valid for a mathematician to ignore it – with two exceptions. Of course most of the basic set constructions as outlined in chapter 2 (unions, intersections, cartesian products,...

The uniequness theorem for the Tsallis entropy by introducing the generalized Faddeev’s axiom is proven. Our result improves the recent result, the uniqueness theorem for Tsallis entropy by the generalized Shannon-Khinchin’s axiom in [7], in the sence that our axiom is simpler than his one, as similar that Faddeev’s axiom is simpler than Shannon-Khinchin’s one.

In this article, I draw attention to the value of community in John Mbiti’s philosophy using his famous axiom by reconciling tension between individual and envisages. To do this, offer a reconstruction communitarian axiom: “I am because we are; since are, therefore am.” Mbiti is considered one forerunners debate African philosophy. His axiom, which describes idea Afro-communitarianism, accounts...

We formulate a restricted version of the Tukey-Teichmüller Theorem that we denote by (rTT). We then prove that (rTT) and (BPI) are equivalent in ZF and that (rTT) applies rather naturally to several equivalent forms of (BPI): Alexander Subbase Theorem, Stone Representation Theorem, Model Existence and Compactness Theorems for propositional and first-order logic. We also give two variations of (...

We study a standard model of exchange economies with individual endowments. It is well known that no rule is individually rational, e cient, and strategyproof. In order to quantify the extent of this impossibility, we parametrize axioms on allocation rules. Given an axiom A, a parametrization of A is a continuum of axioms {δ-A}δ∈[0,1] such that (i) δ-A is equivalent to A only if δ = 1; (ii) δ-A...