We analyse strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” With hidden actions, there exists a unique equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. This randomization induces belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. When actions are observable, the equilibrium is pure, and welfare improves. We analyse the role ...

This paper presents a study of successive new product introductions in the mature tennis racket industry. The inquiry examines novel design’s important role in strategic renewal, under the assumption that innovation includes not only the development, production, and launch of new products, but also communication between firms and market. We explore this industry’s transformation through the str...

I analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two-player games. Specifically, I assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other. A central insight is that it is easier to sustain efficient informal agreements if actions are strategic complemen...

Credibly communicating information for agents to act upon is a challenge for central planners and managers. This paper studies the optimal disclosure policy when the relative accuracy (reliability) of the public information cannot be veri…ed and when agents’actions are either strategic complements or substitutes for each other. We …nd that while disclosure of public information improves social ...

The research into SME’s is often presented as quite distinct from strategy or general management research. This paper examines the literature on Strategic Decision Making (SDM) process, drawing in some findings from the SME sector which show some key similarities. The paper makes proposals for research into SDM processes in SME’s, which would clarify both the general management theory and theor...

Strategic negotiations in digital tabletop displays have not been well understood. There is little reported in the literature on how users strategize when group priorities and individual priorities conflict and need to be balanced for a successful collaboration. We conducted an observational study on three digital tabletop systems and a real-world setup to investigate similarities and differenc...

Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and social imitative behavior in a coordination problem on a social network. We observe...

This paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time-dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models. It identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game-theoretic framework. The paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon game in...