We consider a model in which players can form links between themselves under mutual agreement, and the set of all pairwise agreements is called a cooperation structure. We stress that we are particularly interested to the case when some players are antagonistic, i.e., that they are separately “desirable” for someone, but “undesirable” when they are together. We define a class of preferences tha...

We discuss a subscription game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time subscription or access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the subscription income among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive an...

We prove that the Shapley value of every two-sided exact assignment game lies in the core of the game.

In this paper, we argue that both the stable model semantics and its three-valued version are conceptually awed.

In this paper we are concemed with mixed games, i.e., games with on one hand an "ocean" of insignificant players (formalized by a continuum of players) and on the other hand some significant players (atoms). Considering these games as limits of finite games, we show, for the subset pFL, that the Shapley-Hart value of the mixed game corresponding to the uniform probability measure is the limit o...

Article history: Received 22 December 2014 Received in revised form 14 October 2015 Accepted 21 January 2016 Available online 4 February 2016

We introduce ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player’s utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a certain assumption of bounded rationality we derive a straightforward notion of stable outcomes as certain conjectural equilibria. We prove that sev...

This paper investigates the satisfaction of the Non-Contradiction (NC) and Excluded-Middle (EM) laws within the domain of aggregation operators. It provides characterizations both for those aggregation operators that satisfy NC/EM with respect to (w.r.t.) some given strong negation, as well as for those satisfying them w.r.t. any strong negation. The results obtained are applied to some of the ...