A single-item ascending auction in which agents observe multidimensional Gaussian signals about their valuation of the good is studied. A class of equilibria is constructed in two steps: (i) the private signals of each agent are projected into a one-dimensional equilibrium statistic, and (ii) the equilibrium strategies are constructed “as if” each agent observed only his equilibrium statistic. ...

This paper considers an overlapping generations model of endogenous fertility, savings and intergenerational transfers. While subgame perfect equilibrium notion is more relevent to analyze individual incentives in this set-up, due to computational complexity and lack of an appropriate equilibrium selection theory, most previous studies employed the open-loop Nash equilibrium. This paper introdu...

This paper develops a new experimental environment for the study of markets. The period structure of classical experimental markets, which is known to play an important role in the equilibration process, is replaced by an environment with a structure in which new incentives arrive randomly and continuously throughout. The issue posed is whether or not classical principles of market behavior app...