Abstract Taking a cue from Teilhard de Chardin's Christologically inflected speculation, the key question in this issue is whether project of transhumanism compatible with Christianity and Incarnation Christ. Two articles focus on theological anthropology limits, if any, human perfection light Christ's perfection. Another article examines ontological claims about nature its incompatibility Chri...

Decentralized decision-making in supply chain management is quite common, and often inevitable, due to the magnitude of the chain, its geographical dispersion, and the number of agents that play a role in it. But, decentralized decision-making is known to result in inefficient Nash equilibrium outcomes, and optimal outcomes that maximize the sum of the utilities of all agents need not be Nash e...

Climate change is found to be the most important global issue in the 21st century, so to monitor its trend is of great importance. Atmospheric General Circulation Models because of their large scale computational grid are not able to predict climatic parameters on a point scale, so small scale methods should be adapted. Among downscaling methods, statistical methods are used as they are easy to...

conclusions elevated serum pth level was the predictive factor for nash in morbidly obese patients. also, we reported elevated serum liver enzymes, high serum pth levels and older age as predictors of nash in patients seeking obesity surgical treatments. results forty-six patients (34 women, aged 36.5 ± 10.6 years) were analyzed. the mean levels of liver enzymes were significantly higher in the...

In the present paper we overlay boolean game with norms. Norms distinguish illegal strategies from legal strategies. Two types of legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium are defined. These two equilibrium are viewed as solution concepts for law abiding agents in norm augmented boolean games. Our formal model is a combination of boolean games and so called input/output logic. We study various ...

This paper studies a market game under uncertainty in which agents may submit multiple limit and market orders. When agents know their preferences at all states, the competitive equilibrium can be supported as a Nash equilibrium of the market game, that is, agents behave as if they were price takers. Therefore, if the associated competitive economy has a fully revealing rational expectations eq...

Many problems in multiagent learning involve repeated play. As such, naive application of Nash equilibrium concepts are often inappropriate. A recent algorithm in the literature (Stimpson & Goodrich 2003) uses a Nash bargaining perspective instead of a Nash equilibrium perspective, and learns to cooperate in self play in a social dilemma without exposing itself to being exploited by selfish age...

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we in...

Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used in several real-world security applications. This work has generally assumed a Stackelberg model where the defender commits to a mixed strategy first. In general two-player normal-form games, Stackelberg strategies are easier to compute than Nash equilibria, though it has recently been shown that in many security games, Stackelberg st...