Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient. JEL Classification: C73, D43, L13

In this note we construct a simple international differentiated duopoly model that involves a divisionalization decision. It will be shown that the number of third market divisions of a parent firm with a cost advantage is relatively large. The results imply that the cost competitiveness of one country’s firm will be magnified through divisionalization decisions.

We consider a model of wage determination with private information in a duopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the complete absence of any form of regulation. JEL codes: L13, L51, Q55, Q58

In most spatial markets, firms use either FOB or uniform delivered pricing, so the competitive factors motivating this choice and its welfare implications are important research questions. Prior work on duopoly using inelastic demands leads to biased results and our model on duopsony with elastic supply eliminates the bias. (subject code: 3) * The corresponding author.

In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.

We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs. Mathematics Subject Classification: 34K18, 47N10; Jel Classification: C61, C62, H26

In their recent work, Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) showed that in the context of a mixed duopoly, equilibrium social welfare is higher in price-setting competition than in quantity-setting competition. We found that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently high, the above result is totally reversed; thus, in a mixed duopoly, the presence of network effects weakens the superiority of p...

The paper considers a nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players, boundely rational and naive expectations. A duopoly game is modelled by two nonlinear difference equations. The existence and stability of the equilibria of this system are studied. The complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by computing numerically the largest Lyapunov exponents, sensitive dependence on in...