We reconsider the well known Becker Coase (BC ) theorem according to which changes in divorce law should not affect divorce rates. We do that in a context of households that consume public goods in addition to private goods. For the Becker-Coase theorem to hold in this setting, utility must be transferable both within marriage and upon divorce, and the marginal rate of substitution between publ...

The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable p...

The presence of public goods seriously challenges traditional or “natural” solutions for the allocation of private goods. Important policy questions, of whether we can rely on the market to provide optimal amounts of public goods such as air pollution, and how much we can rely on “natural” processes such as voluntary contribution to solve environmental problems, boil down to fundamental issues ...

In thiswork, the depreciation effect of public goods is considered in the public goods games, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r ′ = r( nc G ) β (β ≥ 0). It is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit r of the public goods if all the players of this group are cooperators. Otherwise, the value of public goods is reduced to r . It is found tha...

We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the Pareto-efficient allocation it wants to implement. The mechanism then guarantees that initial endowments ar...