We study manipulability in elections when the number of candidates is large. Elections with a large number of voters have been studied in the literature and the focus of this paper is on studying election with a large number of candidates. Manipulability, when the number of candidates is large, is significant in the context of computational social choice. Our investigation in this paper covers ...

This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous and strategy proof. The other two are bhybridQ procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCS) and with no rebates (NR). PCS satisfies all these properties except ...

In this paper, we study a resource allocation problem of economies with many commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and anonymity, if the number of good is only one and pereferences are single-peaked. (Sprumont [7].) However, if the number of goods is greater than one, the s...

Data has appeared to be a new kind of commodity with distinctive characteristics, which make it fundamentally different from physical goods as well as traditional digital goods. Therefore, new trading mechanisms for data need to be designed. In this paper, we model the data market as an auction with negative externalities, and design practical mechanisms for data trading. Specifically, we propo...

Voting theory provides useful insights for multiagent preference aggregation. However, the standard setting assumes totally ordered preferences, as well as a ballot language that coincides with the preference language. In typical AI scenarios, these assumptions do not hold: certain alternatives may be incomparable for some agents, and others may have their preferences encoded in a format that i...

This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on different dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination does not necessarily coincide with that under strict domination. We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strateg...

We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategyproofness (SP) for market design. Conceptually, SP-L requires that an agent who regards a mechanism’s “prices” as exogenous to her report – be they traditional prices as in an auction mechanism, or price-like statistics in an assignmen...

Low voltage distribution grids play an important role in the energy transition—both generation and demand. In coming decades reliability of these may deteriorate due to asset ageing. Various maintenance (replacement) strategies are compared order mitigate this. For multiple scenarios, it is analysed under which circumstances when alternative more profitable than current practice towards managin...