Game theory is a mathematical approach to analyze the state of competition between players. The foundations this go back about 170 years, and main development subject based on last 55 years. In study, effect game political elections behaviors has been examined. Nash equilibrium investigated by creating model gains losses that two parties obtain in according coalition formation status using Pris...

The ability to accurately assess others’ intents, beliefs, and emotions – called Theory of Mind (ToM) – is conjectured to be important for social cooperation. We study the role of ToM ability in fostering cooperation in the simultaneous and sequential prisoners dilemma (PD) games. Our norm-based model predicts that high ToM ability individuals will believe in more cooperation and cooperate at h...

This paper investigates a deterministic evolutionary process governing the adoption of strategies for playing the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents playing unsuccessful strategies attempt to imitate the strategies of successful agents. Because agents' strategies are unobservable, they must be inferred from a memory of pairwise play and a knowledge of the strategy space. As a result, winning s...

In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players communicate and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players patient and impatient which are private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types and this is common knowledge then they can cooperate with...

This paper studies the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...

We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value, the maximum efficient payoff is not an ...

In the prisoners’ dilemma game, the only evolutionarily stable strategy is defection, even though mutual cooperation yields a higher payoff. Building on a paper by Robson (1990), we introduce mutants who have the ability to send a (costly) signal, i.e., the “secret handshake,” before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their ...

A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players’ options, motivation...

Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners’dilemma. We …nd conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner’s ...