A dynamic repeated game model has been established based on heterogeneous expectations in electric power triopoly. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation show the complexity of this model; suppose that the producers make decisions with naive expectation and bounded rationality. The straight-line stabilization chaos control method was successfully applied to the dynamic repeated game mode...

We propose a new method for opportunistic power control in multi-carrier interference channels for delay-tolerant data services. In doing so, we utilize a game theoretic framework with novel constraints, where each user tries to maximize its utility in a distributed and opportunistic manner, while satisfying the game’s constraints by adapting its transmit power to its channel. In this scheme, u...

An implementation of a design for a game based virtual learning environment is described. The game is developed for a course in analogue electronics, and the topic is the design of a power supply. This task can be solved in a number of different ways, with certain constraints, giving the students a certain amount of freedom, although the game is designed not to facilitate trial-anderror approac...

In this paper, we investigate a noncooperative sequential bargaining game for allowing a group of agents agents to partition themselves into non-overlapping coalitions. We focus on the issue of how a player’s position on the bargaining agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relationship between the distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare e...

This paper investigates optimal power control in a frequency selective multiuser interference network. The power control problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game. The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the game is established, and an iterative water-filling algorithm is proposed to efficiently reach the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium point corresponds...

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians’ behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We derive the following results: i) Political competition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition f...

We propose Compatibility Weighted Voting Games, a variant of Weighted Voting Games in which some pairs of agents are compatible and some are not. In a Weighted Voting Game each agent has a weight, and a set of agents can form a winning coalition if the sum of their weights is at least a given quota. Whereas the original Weighted Voting Game model assumes that all agents are compatible, we consi...