We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is su¢ cient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses). Keywords: Envy, Pride, Wages, Prizes, Bonus JEL Classi…cation: C72, D01, D23, L14.

On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations p. 111 On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms p. 120 Stable Rankings in Collective Decision Making with Imprecise Information p. 132 Finding Best k Policies p. 144 Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis New Hybrid Recommender Approaches: An Application to Equity Funds Selection p. 156 A Prescriptive Approach for Eliciting Imprecise Weight Statements in an MCDA P...

Most agree that envy, or at least the malicious kind(s), should not have any role in moral justification of distributive arrangements. This paper defends a contrary position. It argues very John Rawls, Axel Honneth and others care about social bases self-esteem good reasons to levels envy different principles reliably generate. The basic argument is (1) involves particular kind harm such exclud...

In this paper we study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a …nite set of indivisible goods among a group of agents when monetary compensations are possible. In the …rst part of the paper we consider the case where each agent receives, at most, one indivisible good. We prove that the set of equilibrium allocations of any direct revelation game associated ...

Cake cutting is a fundamental model in fair division; it represents the problem of fairly allocating a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. The central criteria of fairness are proportionality and envy-freeness, and many of the existing protocols are designed to guarantee proportional or envy-free allocations, when the participating agents follow the protocol. H...

We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents’ values are drawn independently from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson [1] as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism desi...