This paper analyzes optimal joint income taxation of two-earner couples. Each couple is modelled as a single rational economic agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary and secondary earnings. In contrast to the previous literature, we consider fully general joint income tax systems. The optimum tax system is separable into two individual and independent tax schedules only if skills, ...

Based on numerical simulations there seems to be a kind of consensus in the optimal tax literature that the marginal tax rate should fall rather than rise with income. Retaining the same formal structure as in Mirrlees (1971) this paper shows that this consensus is sensitive to a choice of the assumed form of utility of consumption. For the utility function quadratic in consumption optimum tax ...

In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorg...

This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation and payment services in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consumption and income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to ...nal consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is ...xed and the same across ...rms, the optimal taxes are generally indeterminate. But...

In this paper, we analyze the optimal default strategy of a firm when debt is convertible into equity. For this purpose, we consider a convertible consol bond in a time-independent model in the presence of bankruptcy costs and tax deductability. The optimal default and conversion strategy result from a game between equity and debt holders. We show that an optimal default of convertible debt occ...

This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optim...

In an economy where corruption is pervasive, how should tax inspectors be compensated? The optimal compensation scheme must take into account the strategic interaction between taxpayers and tax inspectors. Pure “tax farming” (paying tax inspectors a share of their tax collections) is optimal only when all tax inspectors are corruptible. When there are both honest and corruptible inspectors, the...

Abstract: The traditional view that a high sales tax rate reduces trade by driving a wedge between the purchase and sale price may not apply to internet commerce for two reasons. The first reason is that the sales tax paid by buyers purchasing via the internet is determined by the tax rate in the region of the buyer. The second reason is that a high sales tax may lower the before-tax price if s...

When individuals’ labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two period general equilibrium model with production, we …rst show that reducing investment is welfare improving if households are homogeneous enough ex ante. On the other hand, when the degree of heterogeneity is su¢ ciently high a welfare improvemen...

Should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how when individuals’labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks? In a two period general equilibrium model with production, we first show that reducing investment is welfare improving if households are homogeneous enough ex ante. On the other hand, when the degree of heterogeneity is suffi ciently high a welfare improveme...