In this article, the energy market is a modeled as a Stackelberg game involving three categories of agents: microgrids made of end users sharing the same energy provider, suppliers and generators. The energy production is decentralized involving non-renewables, renewables and demand response performed at the microgrid level. We compute analytically the Nash equilibrium of the game in the genera...

The issue of resource allocation for MSE minimization in a DS/CDMA amplify-and-forward relayassisted interference channel is addressed in this paper. The resource allocation process is assumed to take place in a hierarchical way. First, the relay announces his amplifyand-forward matrix, and then the multiple access users non-cooperatively react to the relay’s choice. This process is modeled by ...

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets we find no significant differences in...

duopoly game theory is applied to the wood industrial markets (sawnwood and pulpwood markets) in the north of iran. the nash equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. the probability that the nash equilibrium will be reached is almost zero. the dynamical properties of sawnwood and pulpwood prices derived via the duopoly game model are fou...

in iran’s system of tripartite collective bargaining, does the wage-policy maker consistently react optimally to the best move made by the exchange rate-policy maker (nash-rule) or only to the state of economy (non-nash rule)?. this paper not only investigates the nature of the political game (nash rule against non-nash rule) but also estimates some structural parameters by using 2sls method an...

0377-2217/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. A http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.003 ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 35742653; fax: E-mail address: [email protected] (U.-P. Wen This study considers pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer, who sells a product to an independent retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manu...

We describe a method for an agent playing a generalsum normal form game to balance the rewards of exploiting a prediction of opponent behavior with the risks of being exploited by a self-interested opponent while guaranteeing a worst-case safety margin. Our algorithm, Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety, calculates a probability distribution over the agent’s moves that balances those co...

In this paper, we introduce the concept of dynamic pricing within the context of our previous Stackelberg network game model and view the ISP’s policy as an incentive policy, and the underlying game as a reverse Stackelberg game. We study this incentive-design problem under complete information as well as incomplete information. In both cases, we show that the game is not generally incentive co...

Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs) is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human’s health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to pr...

in this paper, the competition between two supply chains and their elements is studied. each chain consisted of a manufacturer and a distributor and the two chains compete in a market with single type of customer sensitive to price and delivery time. therefore, this is a two-supply chain game and during the competition between two supply chains, elements of each supply chain (manufacturer and/o...