In recent years, there has been a steadily increasing recognition of the need to improve the cultural competence of services and cultural adaptation of interventions so that every individual can benefit from evidence-based care. There have been attempts at culturally adapting evidence-based interventions for mental health problems, and a few meta-analyses have been published in this area. This ...

Improving outcomes for children and adolescents with mental health needs demands a broad meta-systemic orientation to overcome persistent problems in current service systems. Improving outcomes necessitates inclusion of current and emerging evidence about effective practices for the diverse population of youth and their families. Key components of the meta-system for children with emotional or ...

Synapses are centrally involved in many brain disorders, particularly in psychiatric and neurodevelopmental ones. However, our current understanding of the proteomic alterations affecting synaptic performance in the majority of mental illnesses is limited. As a result, novel pharmacotherapies with improved neurological efficacy have been scarce over the past decades. The main goal of synaptic p...

OBJECTIVE This meta-analysis was conducted to investigate the effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) on the mental and physical health status of various cancer patients. METHODS Ten studies (randomized-controlled trials and observational studies) were found to be eligible for meta-analysis. Individual study results were categorized into mental and physical variables and Cohen's ...

the purpose of this study was to compare the effects of different combinations of mental and physical practices on the acquisition and retention of a motor skill in mentally retarded male students. subjects were 40 guidance students who were healthy and novice in basketball penalty shot. they were selected randomly and were assigned to 5 homogeneous groups (4 as experimental and 1 as control) b...

Defending first-person introspective access to own mental states, we argue against Carruthers’ claim of mindreading being prior to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we understand our own and others’ mental states. We conclude that a model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of access for self and other is sufficient and more consistent with the