Building on the literature that investigates citizen and voter trust in government, we analyze the topic of voter confidence in the American electoral process. Our data comes from two national telephone surveys where voters were asked the confidence they have that their vote for president in the 2004 election was recorded as intended. We present preliminary evidence that suggests confidence in ...

We provide the first polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing if a profile of (possibly weak) preference orders is top-monotonic. Top-monotonicity is a generalization of the notions of single-peakedness and single-crossingness, defined by Barberà and Moreno. Top-monotonic profiles always have weak Condorcet winners and satisfy a variant of the median voter theorem. Our algorithm proceeds by re...

Some US states have introduced measures to increase voter participation. I develop a formal model of elections to study how these measures affect political outcomes. I find that at high enough levels, measures to increase turnout lead to candidates converging at the median voter’s ideal point, as candidates switch from choosing policies that motivate their partisan base to competing over centri...

A Dual Policy Paradox: Why Have Trade and Immigration Policies Always Differed in Labor-Scarce Economies? Today's labor-scarce economies have open trade and closed immigration policies, while a century ago they had just the opposite, open immigration and closed trade policies. Why the inverse policy correlation, and why has it persisted for almost two centuries? This paper seeks answers to this...

Governments do not always enforce their laws, even when they have the means of doing so, and lax enforcement is common in domain immigration policy. To explain this paradox we develop a political agency model where gains from migration are unevenly distributed, an elected government chooses both quotas enforcement. We show that distributional concerns can perverse effects on policy since utilit...

Demange (2012) generalized the classical singlecrossing property to the intermediate property on median graphs and proved that the representative voter theorem still holds for this more general framework. We complement her result with proving that the linear orders of any profile which is intermediate on a median graph form a Condorcet domain. We prove that for any median graph there exists a p...

One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly [Pauly, M.V., 1968. The economics of moral hazard: comment. American Economic Review 58, 531-537), people face incentives for excess utilization of medical care since they do not pay the full marginal cost for provision. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, a coinsurance can be included in the insurance contract....

Despite an attempt by its own authors, it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) has had convincing empirical backing. In this paper, we adapt that model to a model of state government size. The main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows, government size (as measured by the percentage of income devoted ...

This paper analyzes collective choices in a society with strategic voters and single-crossing preferences. It shows that, in addition to single-peakedness, single-crossingness is another meaningful domain which guarantees the existence of non-manipulable social choice functions. A social choice function is shown to be anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on single-crossing domains if and onl...