We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party membership by contributing money to a party, and where a member’s influence on the policy taken by her party is proportional to her campaign contribution. The polity consists of informed and uninformed voters: only informed voters join parties, and the party campaign chest, the sum of its received ...

We scrutinize the uniqueness issue of the equilibrium behavior of strategic customers making inter-temporal purchase decisions. We present that multiple equilibria can exist even in the simple setting where two identical customers compete for one unit of item. We prove the existence of a unique equilibrium when their valuations follow uniform distribution.

In this note we prove an existence theorem regarding friendly equilibrium points in extensive games with complete information. The friendly equilibrium points is a refinement of equilibrium points. *) Director del Instituto de Matemática Aplicada. Universidad Nacional de San Luis, CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950. C.P. 5700 San Luis. Argentina **) This paper has been partially supported by a ...

This paper identifies a family of absolute consistent inequality indices using a weakly decomposable postulate suggested by Ebert. Because one member employs an Atkinson type aggregation we refer to it as the Atkinson index of consistent inequality. A second member of this family parallels the Kolm index of inequality. Two innovative features of these indices are that no specific structure is i...

1. introduction khorasan’s rural housing, like other regions of iran, is consistent with the environmental, cultural, social and economic conditions. however, unfortunately, despite good efforts made by the relevant agencies to assist physical and spatial developments, there have been confusion and misdirection about implementing the needs, facts, and traditions of rural lifestyles. 2. theoreti...

This paper constructs a general equilibrium search-matching model with heterogeneous workers. Workers choose whether to invest in general human capital or specific human capital when they enter the labor market. We analyze how unemployment benefits affect the choice of the type of human capital investment.

The innovative idea of introducing a third party (Ronen,2002) into the agency relationship has motivated our proposal of a co-payment scheme as a solution to financial misreporting. In the co-payment scheme, both the client firm and a third party such as FASB are asked to share the auditing fee. We will demonstrate that the participation of a third party can create an endogenous collusion cost ...