Abstract For some, the states and processes involved in realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within organismic boundaries experiencing subject. Instead, sub-personal basis perceptual experience can, does, extend beyond brain body implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with world. These claims met by proponents predictive processing, who propose that pe...

A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I suggest that many of these cases, such as the sleeping beauty case, are entangled with issues that are independent of self-locating beliefs per se. In light of this, I propose a division of labor: we should address each of these issues separately before we try to provide a comprehensive account o...

Abstract One of the key concepts Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is noema. Husserl uses concept to denote aspect what intended in experience as it remains within domain inquiry after phenomenological reduction. Despite such seeming simplicity, discussion noema ambiguous extent that has sparked a wide-ranging debate secondary literature. The gist dispute concerns question about rel...

Consciousness is not only a philosophical but also a technological issue, since a conscious agent has evolutionary advantages. Thus, to replicate a biological level of intelligence in a machine, concepts of machine consciousness have to be considered. The widespread internalistic assumption that humans do not experience the world as it is, but through an internal ‘3D virtual reality model’, hin...

Abstract Looking beyond the internalism–externalism debate, we offer a distributed view of how experience can garner linguistic and mental content. To make case, first, challenge idea that cognition is organism-centered synchronistic. Instead, use Berthoz’s principle “simplexity” to open up multiscalarity cognitive ecosystems. In exemplifying wide cognition, track eyeball’s neurophysiology tran...

According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however, that if phenomenal character supervenes o...

Much of the recent literature on reasons is focused on a common range of issues, concerning, for example, the relation between reasons and motivation, desires, and values, the issue of internalism versus externalism in the theory of reasons, or the objectivity or reasons. This paper is concerned with a different, and orthogonal, set of questions: What are reasons, and how do they support action...

What does it mean to say that an agent has a reason do certain action? Does she would desire the action, or there is some external consideration, which she ought to follow? Or third alternative? The debate between Humean affective (i.e., desire-based) and classical Kantian cognitive theories seemingly ended up in theoretical standoff, and so most of contributors have recently focused on con...

Abstract There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment (extend cognition) and it located squarely within individual (internalism). Recently, new actor has emerged on scene, one looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing (PP) says mind/brain fundamentally engaged in process of minimising difference what predicted about world how a...

Three widespread assumptions of Cognitive-affective Neuroscience are discussed: first, mental functions are assumed to be localized in circumscribed brain areas which can be exactly determined, at least in principle (localizationism). Second, this assumption is associated with the more general claim that these functions (and dysfunctions, such as in neurological or mental diseases) are somehow ...