We consider the climate-policy implications of non-constant time preferences when there is no commitment to future policies. The conceptual and quantitative results follow from the observation that, with time-declining discounting, the unusual delays and persistence of climate impacts provide a commitment device for climate policy-makers, overturning a fundamental climate-policy conclusion from...

The paper examines welfare improving and revenue neutral directions marginal policy reforms for an economy with nonidentical individuals and an externality that has a feedback effect on the consumption of taxed goods. It considers three types of policy instruments: the indirect taxes, the uniform poll transfer and public abatement. This extends the framework set up by Ahmad and Stern (1984), Bo...

When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information about each other’s preferences about reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of the clean development mechanism (CDM) for the likelihood of such failure. The CDM has been introduced in the context of the Kyo...

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment....

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment....

When scientists choose research projects with the highest expected value an externality can appear; slight variations on existing work will be selected in preference to new lines of research that would ultimately generate more value. New research enjoys two advantages: it is riskier and hence more likely to lead to high-value spin-o¤ projects and it can generate more spin-o¤ projects. Less comm...

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on...

This paper discusses a novel approach to elicit people’s preferences for public goods, namely the life satisfaction approach. Reported subjective well-being data are used to directly evaluate utility consequences of public goods. The strengths of this approach are compared to traditional approaches and identification issues are addressed. Moreover, it is applied to estimate utility losses cause...

An open puzzle for climate-policy analysis is how policies could be made sensitive to climate change impacts spanning over centuries while keeping the shorterterm macroeconomic policies connected to the descriptive facts. We develop a tractable general-equilibrium model for climate-economy interactions with timedeclining pure discounting. The model resolves the puzzle: preferences over longterm...

This paper introduces an index of tax optimality that measures the distance of some current tax structure from the optimal tax structure in the presence of public goods. In doing so, we derive a [0, 1] number that reveals immediately how far the current tax configuration is from the optimal one and, thereby, the degree of efficiency of a tax system. We call this number the Tax Optimality Index....