In this note we show that the results developed in Singh and Vives (1984) are sensitive to the duopoly assumption (Rand Journal of Economics 15, 546-554). If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality firms may...

ELECTIONS AND ASSET PRICING: THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE EQUITY OF US MILITARY CONTRACTORS by

In contrast with the classical models of frictionless financial markets, market models with proportional transaction costs, even satisfying usual no-arbitrage properties, may admit arbitrage opportunities of the second kind. This means that there are self-financing portfolios with initial endowments laying outside the solvency region but ending inside. Such a phenomenon was discovered by M. Rás...

Focus is here on coalitional games among economic agents plagued by aggregate pollutions of diverse sorts. Defecting players presumably pollute more than others. Then, granted convex preferences and technologies, the core is proven nonempty. In fact, under natural assumptions, a specific, computable core solution comes in terms of shadow prices on the said aggregates. Such prices may, in large ...

For portfolio choice problems with proportional transaction costs, we discuss whether or not there exists a shadow price, i.e., a least favorable frictionless market extension leading to the same optimal strategy and utility. By means of an explicit counter-example, we show that shadow prices may fail to exist even in seemingly perfectly benign situations, i.e., for a log-investor trading in an...

In order to attract more and more customers, the price war between service providers (SPs) is becoming increasingly fierce. This kind of conflict situations has been analyzed and hugely studied by a plenty of works in the related literature. However unfortunately, almost all prior works neglect an important decision parameter, it is the promised quality of service which can be a serious advanta...

We analyze Bertrand’s price competition in a homogenous good market with a fixed cost and an increasing marginal cost (i.e., with variable returns to scale). If the fixed cost is avoidable, we show that the non-subadditivity of the cost function at the output corresponding to the oligopoly break-even price, denoted by D(pL(n)), is sufficient to guarantee that the market supports an equilibrium ...

This paper analyses coordination in a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, where the retailer has the opportunity to return products at midlife and end-of-life. The paper examines particularly the coordination problem when the supplier has the opportunity to realise a limited amount of overstock items at a higher price than the retailer at midlife. In this paper return options ...

New regulations grant network service providers with the right to lease their spectrum to short-term leased secondary users (SUs) for opportunistic usage. In this work, we tackle the challenge of determining admission control and pricing policies on SUs that guarantee profitability under general secondary demand and general traffic models, and accurately reflect the operation of modern cellular...