In this paper I combine the dynamic epistemic logic of Gerbrandy (1999) with the probabilistic logic of Fagin and Halpern (1994). The result is a new probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, a logic for reasoning about probability, information, and information change that takes higher order information into account. Probabilistic epistemic models are defined, and a way to build them for applicati...

Justification Logic is the study of a family of logics used to reason about justified true belief. Dynamic Epistemic Logic is the study of a family of logics obtained by adding various kinds of communication to the language of multi-modal logic, yielding languages for reasoning about communication and true belief. This paper is a first-step in merging these two areas, in that it brings the most...

We examine a version of the surprise examination paradox using dynamic epistemic logic. We claim that the difficulties in the puzzle arise from the assumption that announcements are in general successful: the hearer will come to believe that they are true. This principle fails in certain specific cases, and we show that the announcement in the surprise exam paradox is an example. In dynamic epi...

This paper surveys the interface between the two major logical trends that describe agents’ intelligent interaction over time: dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) and epistemic temporal logic (ETL). The initial attempt to “merge” DEL and ETL was made in [12] and followed up by [11] and [29]. The merged framework provides a systematic comparison between these two logical systems and studies new logics...

This ‘Russian Cards’ problem originated at the Moscow Math Olympiad 2000. An analysis in dynamic epistemic logic and various solutions are presented in [vD03]. But there remained some open questions related to the dynamics. In this contribution we answer one of those questions. They are not trivial, because the interpretation of an announcement that is made towards a solution of the problem, al...

Dynamic epistemic logic is the logic of the effects of epistemic actions like making public announcements, passing private messages, revealing secrets, telling lies. This paper takes its starting point from the version of dynamic epistemic logic of [2], and demonstrates a tool that can be used for showing what goes on during a series of epistemic updates: the dynamic epistemic modelling tool DE...

In this work we investigate the feasibility of the project of showing that a certain kind of generalisations that philosophers call ‘Epistemic Principles’, which state conditions for the achievement of epistemic goods such as justifications and entitlements, fulfil general conditions for their correctness. First, we identify the veritistic commitments underlying the project; it is argued that s...

We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only "secondary values" that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones whe...

I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focussed on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads...