Asymmetric information can reduce trade (possibly to zero) due to adverse selection. Symmetric information can facilitate trade. We show that trade between agents is maximized, and welfare highest, when neither party to a transaction has any information about the future payoffs of the securities used to trade. Trade is best implemented by debt which preserves ignorance because it provides the s...

In costly voting models, voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the benefit from voting. In probabilistic voting models, they always vote for a candidate who generates the highest utility, which is subject to random shocks. We prove an equivalence result: In two-candidate elections, given any costly voting model, there exists a probabilistic voting model that generates winning ...

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedl...

A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predicti...

We show how to nonparametrically identify the distribution of heterogeneity using the linear independence of a class of structural economic choice models. We state an economic property known as reducibility and prove that reducibility ensures linear independence and hence identi cation. Reducibility makes verifying the identi cation of nonlinear models easy. We can allow for a nonparametric dis...

A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predicti...

We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A judicious de…nition of status categories can be used by a principal in order to in‡uence the agents’performance. We …rst consider a pure status case where there are no tangible prizes. Our main results connect the optimal partition in status categories to properties o...

This paper assesses the effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the labor supply of Americans ages 51 and older. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Importantly, we model the two key channels by which health insurance rates ...

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE...

We argue theoretically and document empirically that aging leads to greater (industrial) automation, and in particular, to more intensive use and development of robots. Using US data, we document that robots substitute for middle-aged workers (those between the ages of 36 and 55). We then show that demographic change—corresponding to an increasing ratio of older to middle-aged workers—is associ...