A generalization of Lax-Hopf formula in the case when the Lagrangian depends not only on the velocity, but also on time and velocity has been provided in [15, Chen Luxi]. On the other hand, Cournot maps have been introduced and studied in [6, Aubin & Chen Luxi] for associating with terminal time and state a temporal window on which starts at least one evolution governed by a differential inclus...

In this study behavior in a Cournot duopoly with two production periods (the market clears only after the second period) is compared to behavior in a standard one-period Cournot duopoly. Theory predicts the endogenous emergence of a Stackelberg outcome in the two-period market. The results of the experiments, however, reveal that in both markets (roughly) symmetric outcomes emerge and that, aft...

A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and then compete in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. Sequential entry is never observed. ...

We study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games when players have other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over payoff distributions. In both the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly games, the consistent conjectures are independent of other regarding preferences. Both duopoly games have evolutionarily stable conjectures that depend on other regarding preferences but that do no...

Lambson (1984) has derived the restrictive conditions under which cooperation may be maintained in a Cournot market with a large numbers of firms. He does this in the context of a repeated game, where a trigger strategy with infinite Nash reversion is the enforcement mechanism. In this paper, Lambson's (1984) result is reinterpreted, and it is argued that cooperation among a large number of Cou...

We consider Cournot competition in general equilibrium. Decisions firms are taken by majority voting. Naturally, interests of voters—shareholders or stakeholders—depend on their endowments and portfolios. Indeed, voters every firm concerned about the return portfolios rather than shares firm. introduce two notions local Cournot–Walras equilibria to overcome difficulties arising from non-concavi...

The author describes a series of matrix choice games illustrating monopoly, shared monopoly, Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg behavior given either perfect complements or perfect substitutes. The games are created by using a spreadsheet to fill out a profit table given the choices of two players. One player selects the column, the other the row, and the table gives the profit of the row choos...