The coordination of a decentralized supply chain can be achieved by adopting supply chain contracts. This paper investigates how a decentralized supply chain can be coordinated by a revenue sharing contract, in which the supplier offers the retailer a lower wholesale price in return for a percentage of the retailer’s revenue. Salvage value and goodwill loss are taken into consideration, since i...

This work explores the impact of quick response on supply chain performance for various supply chain structures with strategic customer behavior. By investigating pricing and inventory decisions in decentralized supply chains under revenue-sharing contracts and in centralized supply chains, we study the performance of four various systems and compare the value of quick response in different sup...

One of the main priorities of companies involved in supply chains is improving the quality of their products. However, as in other parts of supply chain management, decentralized decision-making in supply quality management is prevalent, which causes inefficiencies such as the well-known double marginalization phenomenon. Coordinating schemes, such as the revenue sharing contract, can contribut...

T coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in whic...

Operative commencement date of the contract: the first day of the month after the last signature of the contracting parties

We study how interactions between financing and investment decisions can shape firm boundaries in innovative markets. In particular, we model innovative projects as growth options and ask whether they are best operated inside large incumbent firms (Integration) or in separate, specialized firms (Non-Integration). Starting from a standard theoretical framework, in which value-maximizing corporat...

We study incentives for information sharing among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing always increases expected grower and total surplus, but may reduce expected intermediary profits. Even when expected profits increase with information sharing, intermediary firms face a Prisoner’s Dilemma where it is privately rational to withhold...

The objective of cooperative game theory is to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents willing to cooperate. A central question in this field is how the benefits (or costs) of a joint effort can be divided among participants, taking into account individual and group incentives, as well as various fairness properties. In this chapter, we define basic concepts and review some o...

Few micro…nance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing micro…nance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that uni…es models of investment choice, informal insurance, and formal …nancial contracts. I then test the predic...