Due to uncertain nature of wind and photovoltaic power units, the participation of this units in electricity markets is subjected to significant deviation penalties. This issue leads to despondency or even admission of these units in the competitive environment. With regard to this fact that the low deviations are available when predictions are performed in a short-term horizon and also distrib...

this paper represents a complete survey on generation companies’ (gencos’) optimal bidding strategy problem in restructured power markets. in this regard after an introduction to competitive electricity markets, concept of optimal bidding strategy is presented. considering large amount of works accomplished in this area a novel classification is implemented in order to categorize the existing d...

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price o¤ers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power we show that they set competitive prices in the limit when frictions become small. Previous literature...

In this paper we show that firms’ market power and flexibility in the utilization of capital crucially affect how investment-specific technology (IST) shocks impact asset prices. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model in which households have recursive preferences and obtain three main results. First, the equilibrium price of risk for IST shocks changes sign from negative, under fixe...

The author reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the traditional perception that the following trade-off exists between economic efficiency and stability in the banking system: a competitive banking system is more efficient and therefore important to growth, but market power is necessary for stability in the banking system. That this trade-off exists is not clear. Market p...

Several regulatory authorities worldwide have imposed forward contract obligations on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In order to understand the e¤ects of such contractual obligations, we introduce forward contracting in a uniform-price auction model with complete information and discrete bids. The model predicts that forward contracts are generally pro-competitiv...

Economists and antitrust authorities recognize that firms with market power often raise prices above competitive levels and thus earn monopolistic profits that exceed the competitive cost of capital. In both the U.S. and Europe, this recognition has led antitrust authorities (and courts) to consider profitability evidence when determining whether a firm has market power. In Europe, unlike the U...

This paper studies the issue of locational market power of suppliers in a market that is situated on a network. Locational market power arises when locational advantage allows suppliers to act non-competitively and raise prices above competitive levels. We propose a quantifiable definition of locational market power and analyze its properties over a general network. We also conduct a detailed a...

We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects partici...

The paper considers mechanisms for organizing free trade in the electricity market that are based on submitting bids of energy consumers and producers to the market operator. The authors discuss and compare possible strategies of generator behavior that lead to different equilibrium situations and correspond to Cournot model and the models of supply function equilibria, and a perfectly competit...