In multi-attribute procurement auctions with multiple objects, the auctioneer may care about the interplay of quality attributes that do not belong to the same item – like each item’s delivery time, if all items are needed at once. This can influence the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment and show that the main ...

We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder i has a private value vi for each of the items in some set Si, agent i also has a budget constraint bi. The value to agent i of a set of items R is |R ∩ Si| · vi. Such auctions capture adword auctions, where advertisers offer a bid for those adwords that (hopefully) reach their target audience, and advertisers also have budgets....

The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the combinatorial auctioning system (CAS). We use this framework to define our concept of fairness in terms of what we call as “basic fairness” and “extended fairness.” T...

The popularity of auctions has increased dramatically with their introduction on the Internet. This migration has provided a unique opportunity to harness the power of computing to create new auction forms that were previously impossible. We describe a new type of combinatorial auction that accepts incompletely specified bids that provide a framework to guide, rather than dictate, the choice of...

We introduce and study share-averse auctions, a class of auctions with allocation externalities, in which items can be allocated to arbitrarily many bidders, but the valuation of each individual bidder decreases as the items get allocated to more other bidders. For single-item auctions where players have incomplete information about each others’ valuation, we characterize the truthful mechanism...

We reexamine the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced in Archer & Tardos (2001). argue that claimed uniqueness result, called 'Myerson's Lemma' was not well established. provide an elementary proof unifies presentation for two classes allocation functions used literature and show general case is a consequence little known result from theory real fu...

We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the to dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference partitions set as acceptable unacceptable, at same payment level, she is indifferent between in each class but strictly prefers unacceptable bundles. show that there no Pareto efficient, dom...