This paper discusses a fundamental market failure regarding environmental conservation, and how the problem can be solved by appropriate policies. A "seller" (or owner of a tropical forest) may be motivated to conserve if a "buyer" is expected to pay. The buyer, however, does not find it necessary to pay as long as the seller conserves in any case. This contradiction implies that the forest wil...

We study a multi-period bargaining mechanism in which a seller negotiates with a buyer over the price of an indivisible good. It is common knowledge that the good has zero value to the seller. Its value to the buyer is privately known, distributed independently of the seller's value according to a distribution that is common knowledge. Bargaining proceeds as follows. The seller sets a price and...

A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time. Each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option, abandoning their search or moving on to another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price, contravening the Coase conjecture. We then embed the singlesel...

This paper analyzes the effects of buyer search costs and incomplete information, private and common knowledge of the sellers, on seller competition. It turns out that small changes in search costs may have large but quantifiable effects on pricing when the seller has good private knowledge about the buyer, but the common knowledge of the buyer valuations is lacking among the sellers. As an app...

Abstract This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer–seller pair may either trade directly or use services middleman; and middleman serve multiple pairs. For each such market, we examine associated TU game. We first show that, context, an optimal can be obtained by considering two-sided assignment market where is allowed to mediation any free char...

BBbk Dummy variable for each bean type (k) and buyer (b) combination (k = 1,b = 1 base case) BSsk Dummy variable for each bean type (k) and seller (s) combination (k = 1, s = 1 base case) TVmk Overall coffee export volume during month m (kilo tons) DFm Fraction of coffee export volume traded on the digital platform during month m Zbd, Zsd Indicator variable set to 1 if buyer b (seller s) had a ...

We study how seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior on eBay are affected by an improvement in market transparency. The improvement was achieved by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings. It led to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with seller performance, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and im...

We introduce the concept of Market Equilibria related to game theory. In the market, there exists sellers which sell divisible goods and buyers who have a desire to purchase some set of goods. Each buyer places a value on each of the goods in his list that relates to the importance of purchasing that specific good. At market equilibrium, no party (seller or buyer) has incentive to deviate from ...

The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer can disclose his type (e.g. age, income, experience) at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a price list, including a “sticker price” available to any buyer and a schedule of discounts available to those who disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications of such a prici...

The conflicting problems of growing mobile service demand and underutilization of dedicated spectrum has given rise to a paradigm where mobile network operators (MNOs) share their infrastructure among themselves in order to lower their operational costs, while at the same time increase the usage of their existing network resources. We model and analyze such an infrastructure sharing system cons...