In the Shift-Bribery problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and costs of shifting this candidate up voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such set shifts that ensures wins election. We give first polynomial-time approximation scheme for case positional scoring rules, Copeland rule show strong inapproximability results.

Abstract This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment bribery on both and compliance with regulations. The bribe amount is decided via Nash bargaining regulatory whistle‐blowing are strategic decisions. Moreover, investigations noncompliance occur in a manner that may be interdependent. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing has no effect frequency bribery. When independe...

We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair agents matched stable solution, and this may be achieved action reordering some agents' preference lists. present comprehensive computational complexity all problems arising way. find polynomial-time s...

We consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry: unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules. Only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency; in other cases, the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific. We...

The article analyzes the notion of voluntariness used by legislator in notes to Art. 291 Criminal Code Russian Federation “Giving a bribe” and 2911 “Mediation bribery”. use this category practice law enforcement agencies is not uniform, as evidenced extensive jurisprudence analyzed article. main problem lies contradictory assessment fact that accused aware preliminary investigation authorities ...