The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly* by Roman Inderst and Christian Wey This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand o...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. I find that R&D expenditure, prices and firms’ net profits are always higher under quantity competition than under price competition. Furthermore, output, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D spi...

This study considers the strategic relations between emission tax and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison analyzes two different timings of games tax-then-ECSR (T game) an ECSR-then-tax (E game). We show that T game always yields higher than E irrespective competition modes, but lower ECSR under Cournot when marginal damage is high Bertrand comp...

The aim of the paper is to study the Bertrand duopoly example in the quantum domain. We use two ways to write the game in terms of quantum theory. The first one adapts the Li-Du-Massar scheme for the Cournot duopoly. The second one is a simplified model that exploits a two qubit entangled state. In both cases we focus on finding Nash equilibria in the resulting games.

Coase (Journal of Low and Economics 17(2):185–213, 1974) failed to appreciate that the construction and maintenance of nineteenth-century lighthouses were in part financed by British taxpayers. Bertrand (Cambridge Journal of Economics 30:389–402, 2006) rightly calls him to account. While agreeing with Bertrand’s conclusion, we dispute her reasoning and argue that lighthouses nevertheless could ...

In this paper, the Bertrand's price competition in the retail duopoly with asymmetric costs is analyzed. Retailers sell substitute products in the framework of the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) model with linear demand function. The market potential and competitor price are considered to be the bifurcation parameters of retailers. Levels of the barriers to market penetration depending...

Amandine Berthet,1 Erwan Bezard,1,2 Gregory Porras,1 Stefania Fasano,3 Pedro Barroso-Chinea,1 Benjamin Dehay,1 Audrey Martinez,1 Marie-Laure Thiolat,1 Marika Nosten-Bertrand,4 Bruno Giros,4 Jérôme Baufreton,1 Qin Li,2 Bertrand Bloch,1 and Marie-Laure Martin-Negrier1 1Université Victor Segalen-Bordeaux 2, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institute of Neurodegenerative Diseases, 3307...

In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future periods, and consumers who observe price under-cutting may correctly anticipate an ensuing price war and the...