The paper presents a method of supporting certain solutions of two-person bargaining games by unique Nash equilibria of associated games in strategic form. Among the supported solutions is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. I thank Claus Jochen Haake for helpful discussions. The hospitality of the University of California, Los Angeles and of the University of Arizona at Tucson as well as nancial s...

Artificial agents, coevolving under a machine learning regime, offer a promising basis for modeling adaptive behavior in multilateral negotiations and developing practical applications in electronic commerce. Results from simulations of bargaining in two coalition games demonstrate that simple artificial agents, adapting to one another under a genetic programming protocol (Koza, 1992), formulat...

A new treatment to determine the Pareto-optimal outcome for a non-zero-sum game is presented. An equilibrium point for any game is defined here as a set of strategy choices for the players, such that no change in the choice of any single player will increase the overall payoff of all the players. Determining equilibrium for multi-player games is a complex problem. An intuitive conceptual tool f...

It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting their possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from...

Mentalising is assumed to be involved in decision-making that is necessary to social interaction. We investigated the relationship between mentalising and two types of strategic games those involving the choice to cooperate with another for joint gain or compete for own gain and those involving bargaining and division of a surplus in children and adults with and without autistic spectrum disord...

Wediscuss two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Strategic interaction determines an allocation of objects, so that evaluationwith individual utilities constitute the payoffs in the derived games. These allocations of objects are obtained through individual demand in a specific market for objects. For ...

In this paper, we provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium payoffs in the coalitional bargaining model of Eraslan-McLennan (Journal of Economic Theory, 2013) by using recent developments in methods of numerical algebraic geometry. The Eraslan-McLennan model is a legislative bargaining model that studies weighted voting games with players that are potentially heterogeneous in probabilitie...

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their beha...

We introduce a new class of interdependent games, motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains, where different agents have individual utilities but a social welfare objective must be optimized in a decentralized fashion. In these games, the utilities of one player does not depend on the decisions of the other player, giving he...