We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a mea...

We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set (favouring one bargainer) and disagreement pa...

I give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payo¤ sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend th...

Abstract Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998) treatment of his Game Life as a bargaining game and morality an equilibrium selection device for that game, are examined in the context repeated games with both infinite finite horizon. With horizon, there three different viable approaches. They differ way they impact morality.

Farrell’s comparison of Coasean bargaining under incomplete information with second-best centralized regulation is reconsidered by introducing unsure property rights. Rights are unsure, because environmental law is typically incomplete, meaning that the outcome of taking action against environmental regulation is unsure ex ante. I will explore the efficiency implications of a standing to sue fo...

In experimental tests of human behavior in unstructured bargaining games, typically many joint utility outcomes are found to occur, not just one. This suggests we predict the outcome of such a game as a probability distribution. This is in contrast to what is conventionally done (e.g, in the Nash bargaining solution), which is predict a single outcome. We show how to translate Nash’s bargaining...

This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients: (i) there is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) prior to the deadline, players may sequentially change their demands as often as they like; (iii) changing one’s demand is costly, and this cost increases as the deadline gets ...

This research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model. In a departure from the standard empirical channel literature, which assumes that manufacturers set wholesale prices unilaterally, we explicitly model the negot...

In the basic ultimatum bargaining game two players, P1 and P2, must divide a pie (π). P1 proposes a division in which he gets π − x and P2 gets x. P2 can then accept the division, in which the π is split according to P1’s proposal, or reject the proposal, in which case neither player gets anything. The current paper reviews empirical research on ultimatum bargaining games. It covers early work ...

Many papers have used the ultimatum game as a means to test bargaining behavior. A subset of experiments has examined the use of cheap talk and asymmetric in bargaining scenarios. Yet, this earlier work leaves out many of the complicated factors that occur in bargaining in the real world. No research has looked at the interaction of probabilities and threats in ultimatum games. The experiment d...