We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse. JEL Classification: C78, D81

Previous research has shown that more risk averse workers are at a disadvantage when bargaining over wages. However, it has yet to be determined whether this differential treatment can be sustained in markets where equally productive workers differ in their attitudes toward risk. This paper investigates the question by examining a simple matching model in which the standard assumptions of risk ...

the most commonly used utility functional forms are reviewed and their properties compared. then, using data collected from west azarbaijan province, utility functions are estimated and absolute risk aversion coefficients measured. exponential and expopower utility functions classified all farmers as risk averse, but quadratic and cubic utility functions classified 75% and 65% of farmers as...

“I really enjoy the conversations I have with the elderly as part of the Doctoring course, but my comfort in interacting with them as a health care provider is still low...the more exposure I get to the elderly, however, the less averse the idea of working with older patients becomes...the most significant change in my thinking about the elderly was the acknowledgement of a couple of misconcept...

We consider a population of “crowd-averse” dynamic agents controlling their states towards regions of low density. This represents a typical dissensus behavior in opinion dynamics. Assuming a quadratic density distribution, we first introduce a mean-field game formulation of the problem, and then we turn the game into a two-point boundary value problem. Such a result has a value in that it turn...

We study the optimal output of a competitive firm under price uncertainty. Instead of assuming a risk-averse firm, we assume that the firm is regret-averse. We find that optimal output under uncertainty would be lower than under certainty. We also prove that optimal output could increase or decrease when the regret factor varies.