“Objective” is a term applied to outward things, in contrast to “subjective,” used to denote those things that belong to the conscious life. Thus whatever is considered as independent of the perceiving and reasoning self is “objective,” whereas all that belongs to the conscious life is termed “subjective.” We speak of a thing as having “objective reality,” that is, it is an object of perception...

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines payoff for both players. The chooses signals maximize its own utility function while aims ascertain value source is privately known sender. It well such sender–receiver games admit vast number equilibria and not all from...

We consider mechanism design and redesign for markets like Internet advertising where many frequent, small transactions are organized by a principal. Mechanisms for these markets rarely have truthtelling equilibria. We identify a family of winner-pays-bid mechanisms for such markets that exhibit three properties. First, equilibria in these mechanisms are simple. Second, the mechanisms’ paramete...

The strategic interactions among the designer of a mechanism and its participants can be modeled as a multi-stage game. The designer moves first by selecting a mechanism. The participants observe the mechanism, and move thereafter. For ease of exposition, we restrict our present attention to a two-stage game, in which the participants play a simultaneous-move (i.e., one-shot) game in the second...