The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning games is based on a clear distinction between population of dynamic agents that interact given fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away from the artificial divide games, to introduce analyze large class competitive settings where both they play evolve strategically over time. We focus arguably most ar...

A given number of n applicants are to be interviewed for a position of secretary. They present themselves one-by-one in random order, all n! permutations being equally likely. Two players I and II jointly interview the i-th applicant and observe that his (or her) relative rank is y for I and z for II, relative to i − 1 applicants that have already seen (rank 1 is for the best). Each player choo...

Economists use the word rational in a narrow way. To an economist, a rational actor is someone who makes decisions that maximize her (or his) preferences subject to constraints imposed by the environment. So, this actor knows her preferences and knows how to go about optimizing. It is a powerful approach, but it probably is only distantly related to what you mean when you think of yourself as r...

We consider dynamic electromagnetic evasion-interrogation games where the evader can use ferroelectric material coatings to attempt to avoid detection while the interrogator can manipulate the interrogating frequencies to enhance detection. The resulting problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum dynamic differential game in which the cost functional is based on the expected value of the in...

We consider a large community of individuals who mix strongly and meet in pairs to bet on a coin toss. We investigate the asset distribution of the players involved in this zero-sum repeated game. Our main result is that the asset distribution converges to the exponential distribution, irrespective of the size of the bet, as long as players can never go bankrupt. Analytical results suggests tha...

Given a two-player zero-sum discounted-payoff stochastic game, we introduce three classes of continuous-time best-response dynamics, stopping-time best-response dynamics, closed-loop best-response dynamics, and open-loop best-response dynamics. We show the global convergence of the first two classes to the set of minimax strategy profiles, and the convergence of the last class when the players ...

The strategic allocation of resources across multiple fronts has long been studied in the context of Blotto games in which two players simultaneously select their allocations. But many allocation problems are sequential. For example, a state trying to defend against a terrorist attack generally allocates some or all of its resources before the attacker decides where to strike. This paper studie...

A zero-sum perfect information game is one where every player knows all the moves. Chess is a good example where the object is to checkmate or capture the enemy king. One important feature of checkmates, especially in chess problem composition, is economy. This paper proposes a computational function to evaluate the economy of checkmate configurations on the chessboard. Several experiments were...