In the present work we deal with set-valued equilibrium problems for which we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution. The conditions that we consider are imposed not on the whole domain, but rather on a self segment-dense subset of it, a special type of dense subset. As an application, we obtain a generalized Debreu-Gale-Nikaido type theorem, with a considerable weakned W...

The marginalist revolution transformed the principles of price determination in competitive markets. Nevertheless, the systematization that accompanied neo-classical theory, especially Walras’ general equilibrium formulation, confirmed Classical economists’ belief, most powerfully articulated by Smith, that impediments to free trade should be removed. So, while the transition from the Classical...

We explore convergence notions for bivariate functions that yield convergence and stability results for their maxinf (or minsup) points. This lays the foundations for the study of the stability of solutions to variational inequalities, the solutions of inclusions, of Nash equilibrium points of non-cooperative games and Walras economic equilibrium points, of fixed points, of solutions to inclusi...

This essay introduces a symposium on value and exchange as alternative organizing concepts for the pursuit of economic theorizing. These concepts pertain to two distinct conceptual windows though which economic phenomena can be examined. The immediate inspiration for this symposium was Meir Kohn’s (2004) articulation of the distinction, a distinction that in turn was central to James Buchanan’s...

We study a principal-agent game where the principal commits to an affine contract. We suppose that the principal has incomplete information but he can adjust the contract according to the myopically behaving agent’s reactions when the game is played repeatedly. The adjustment process can be considered as a learning model. We derive convergence conditions for fixed-point iteration as an adjustme...

Two basic properties concerning the dynamic behavior of competitive equilibria of exchange economies with complete markets are derived essentially from the fact that the Walras correspondence has no knots. I. One can view the work of Debreu, E. and H. Dierker, Balasko and others that introduced the notions of regular economy and regular equilibrium, and studied the local uniqueness and other mo...

In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with (possibly) unbounded below consumption sets. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this result and its proof do not depend on the dimension or the particular structure of the commodity space. In a secon...