Consider the single-agent decision problem, where the agent chooses the optimal action a ∈ A to maximize her expected utility. The utility depends on the state of nature θ ∈ Θ, and for the remainder of this lecture, we assume that Θ = {θ1, ..., θN} is a finite set with N elements. Assume also that the (state dependent) utility function u(a, θ) is continuous in a for all θ and A is compact. Let ...

This is the peer-reviewed, manuscript version of the following article: Staerk, K and Haesler, B (2015) The value of information: Current challenges in surveillance implementation. PREVENTIVE VETERINARY MEDICINE. The final version is available online via http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.05.002. © 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://...

We develop a theory of how the value of an agent’s information advantage depends on the persistence of information. We focus on strategic situations with strict conflict of interest, formalized as stochastic zero-sum games where only one of the players observes the state that evolves according to a Markov operator. Operator Q is said to be better for the informed player than operator P if the v...