Numerical methods are developed for pricing European and American options under Kou’s jump-diffusion model which assumes the price of the underlying asset to behave like a geometrical Brownian motion with a drift and jumps whose size is log-double-exponentially distributed. The price of a European option is given by a partial integro-differential equation (PIDE) while American options lead to a...

A hybrid stated-preference model is developed that combines the referendum contingent valuation response format with an experimentally designed set of attributes. A sequence of valuation questions is asked to a random sample in a mail-out mail-back format. Econometric analysis shows that willingness to pay for policy attributes is formed dynamically.

In this paper we present some results on Geometric Asian option valuation for affine stochastic volatility models with jumps. We shall provide a general framework into which several different valuation problems based on some average process can be cast, and we shall obtain close-form solutions for some relevant affine model classes.

This study extends the joint estimation of revealed and stated preference data literature by accounting for truncation in the revealed preference data. The analytical model and estimation procedure are used to estimate the value of recreational red snapper fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. This recreational red snapper valuation is decomposed into its direct and indirect components. As expected, t...

This research determines the optimal investment timing using real options valuation to support decision-making for economic sustainability assessment. This paper illustrates an option pricing model using the Black-Scholes model applied to a case project to understand the model performance. Applicability of the project to the model requires two Monte Carlo simulations to satisfy a Markov process...

We analyze a dynamic second-price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the …rst period if her valuation is below some cuto¤ and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally chang...