A non-zero-sum 3-person coalition game is presented , to study the evolution of complexity and diversity in cooperation, where the population dynamics of players with strategies is given according to their scores in the iterated game and mutations. Two types of dierentiations emerge initially ; biased one to classes and temporal one to change their roles for coalition. Rules to change the hands...

We examine the case of a two-person repeated game played by a boundedly rational player versus an unboundedly rational opponent. The former is restricted to strategies which are implementable by connected finite automata. It is shown that the “rational” player has a dominant strategy, and that in some cases the “weaker“ (boundedly rational) player may exploit this fact to “blackmail” him. It is...

The success of the alpha-beta algorithm in game-playing has shown its value for problem solving in artiicial intelligence, especially in the domain of two-person zero-sum games with perfect-information. However, there exist diierent algorithms for game-tree search. This paper describes and assesses those proposed alternatives according to how they try to overcome the limitations of alpha-beta. ...