IntroductIon Executive compensation is perhaps the most contentious issue in corporate governance today. Common consensus holds that CEOs of publicly traded U.S. corporations, particularly the largest U.S. corporations, are overpaid. It is also widely believed that the structure of CEO pay is inappropriate, that rewards are offered without regard to performance, and that compensation design enc...

This paper presents a model of investment timing by risk averse managers facing incomplete markets and corporate control. Managers are exposed to idiosyncratic risks due to the dependence of their compensation on investment payoffs which are not spanned by other assets. We show that risk averse managers invest earlier than welldiversified shareholders would prefer, leading to significant agency...

I examine the role of debt-financed special payments to shareholders in defending incumbent managements during proxy contests. This role is based on shareholder preference for dividends and the consequent linkage between dividends and managerial security. The model is used to explain why the seemingly contradictory phenomena of (i) wealth losses to shareholders and (ii) lack of any substantial ...

The term corporate governance is used in two distinct ways. In Anglo-Saxon countries like the US and UK good corporate governance involves Þrms pursuing the interests of shareholders. In other countries like Japan, Germany and France it involves pursuing the interests of all stakeholders including employees and customers as well as shareholders. Anglo-Saxon capitalism has been widely analyzed b...

From the viewpoint of a company’s controlling shareholder, the optimal ownership structure generally involves some measure of dispersion, to avoid excessive monitoring by other shareholders. The optimal dispersion of share ownership can be achieved by going public, but this choice also entails some costs (the cost of listing and the loss of control over the shareholder register). If the control...

In this paper, I investigate the interaction between the duration of executive compensation and shareholder governance. I show that short-term compensation can elicit shareholder intervention and thus enhance firm value. The central mechanism is that the use of short-term incentives enables informed incumbent shareholders to commit to using their private information to intervene (voice) instead...

A t w threshold scheme is a method for sharing a secret among w shareholders so that the collaboration of at least t shareholders is required in order to reconstruct the shared secret This paper is concerned with the re use of shares possessed by shareholders in threshold schemes We propose a simple t w threshold scheme based on the use of cryptographically strong pseudo random functions and un...

During the last decade, Nigeria has witnessed significant growth in corporate mergers and acquisitions. Reasons behind mergers and acquisitions are to syntheses and enhance the corporate tenacity (synergy). In the existing study, an attempt has been on the study of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the shareholders wealth. The study specifically on companies which have undergone merger ...