I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend von Neumann and Kuhn’s classic axiomatic frameworks. Within this setup, I define a modified backward induction procedure that is applicable to all games. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction equilibrium (BIE). The main result compares the sets of BIE and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). ...

A general framework for exploiting covert channels in combinatorial games is presented. The framework is applicable to all combinatorial games, including Chess and Go, but is applied to the game of Tic-Tac-Toe for ease of experimental analysis. The security and capacity of the resulting covert channel are analyzed experimentally. By considering the ways in which a passive adversary can attempt ...

the purpose of this study was to examine the effect of eight weeks corrective games on kyphosis angle and postural control in kyphotic mentally retarded children. method: thirty mentally retarded girls children with increase normal thoracic kyphosis (kyphosis angle≥40) were selected and randomly divided in two groups training group (n=15 with mean average 12/06±2/8 years old, height 145±1/33cm,...

This note compares public and private information certification in a simple class of communication games with one sender and two receivers. It also emphasizes the role of belief consistency conditions in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of such games.

One of the significant advantages in problems with perfect information, like search or games like checkers, is that they can be decomposed into independent pieces. In contrast, problems with imperfect information, like market modeling or games like poker, are treated as a single decomposable whole. Handling the game as a single unit places a much stricter limit on the size of solvable imperfect...

Within an epistemic model for two-player extensive games, we formalize the event that each player believes that his opponent chooses rationally at all information sets. Letting this event be common certain belief yields the concept of sequential rationalizability. Adding preference for cautious behavior to this event likewise yields the concept of quasi-perfect rationalizability. These concepts...