In order to address inefficiencies of Nash equilibria for horizontal queuing congestion networks, we study the Stackelberg routing game on parallel networks: assuming a coordinator has control over a fraction of the flow, what is a good way of routing that compliant flow so that the induced Nash equilibrium is closer to the social optimum than the initial Nash equilibrium? We study Stackelberg ...

This paper studies the problem of allocating utility losses among n agents with cardinal non-comparable utility functions. This problem is referred to as the Nash rationing problem, as it can be regarded as the translation of the Nash bargaining problem to a rationing scenario. We show that there is no single-valued solution satisfying the obvious reformulation of Nash’s axioms, nor a multivalu...

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stabili...

We study large population stochastic dynamic games where the so-called Nash certainty equivalence based control laws are implemented by the individual players. We first show a martingale property for the limiting control problem of a single agent and then perform averaging across the population; this procedure leads to a constant value for the martingale which shows an invariance property of th...