We adopted an economic analysis to evaluate and discuss the management of conservation and commercial exploitation of whales. In particular, the paper starts from the recent proposal to create and implement a quota market for whale trading and attempts to address and develop selected economic issues, in order to move towards understanding the economics of whales. We can summarize our findings i...

The widely discussed ‘discursive dilemma’shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where di¤erent thresholds may be used for di¤erent pr...

Abstract This paper establishes relationships between static Nash equilibria and dynamic Markov perfect equilibria of tariff and quota retaliation games. In supermodular games where tariffs are strategic complements, the steady state of every, symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium must have lower tariffs than in the static equilibrium. If tariffs are strategic substitutes, tariffs in the dynamic...

This paper considers a dynamic common agency model of natural resource harvest quota regulation in which both conservationists and harvesters vie to influence the regulator’s quota allocations as well as the choice of regulator. Conservationists tend to benefit from the adoption of regulation since the regulator will reduce the aggregate harvest quota relative to the unregulated equilibrium. Ha...

We investigate systems of indirect voting based on the law of Penrose, in which each representative in the voting body receives the number of votes (voting weight) proportional to the square root of the population he or she represents. For a generic population distribution, the quota required for the qualified majority can be set in such a way that the voting power of any state is proportional ...

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreo...