We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by augmenting his endowment through borrowing resources from the outside world (alternatively, by simply exaggerating it). We show that the Walrasian rule is not “borrowing-proof” even on standard domains. More seriously, no efficient selection from the endowments-lower-bound correspondence, or ...

The code of honor, which is characterized by a preoccupation with reputation and willingness to take retaliatory action, has been used extensively to explain individual and cultural differences in peoples' tendencies to behave aggressively. However, research on the relationship between the code of honor and emotional responses to social interactions has been limited in scope, focusing primarily...

The objective of this paper is to consider the following question. Does the presence of increasing returns introduce a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives? We show that if the no-envy notion of Foley (1967) is taken as the equity criterion and Pareto optimality as the efficiency criterion, then the answer is yes; there exist economies with increasing returns and well-...

For decades researchers have struggled with the problem of envy-free cake cutting: how to divide a divisible good between multiple agents so that each agent likes his own allocation best. Although an envy-free cake cutting protocol was ultimately devised, it is unbounded, in the sense that the number of operations can be arbitrarily large, depending on the preferences of the agents. We ask whet...

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In “small” economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent’s maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules which are least manipulable for each ...

Gale (1993) posed the question of whether there is necessarily an undominated, envy-free allocation of a pie when it is cut into wedge-shaped pieces or sectors. For two players, we give constructive procedures for obtaining such an allocation, whether the pie is cut into equal-size sectors by a single diameter cut or into two sectors of unequal size. Such an allocation, however may not be equit...

Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division, and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed. Recent works from the computer science field proposed novelmechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based on the theory of mechanism design; these mechanisms are strategy-proof, i.e., no agent has any incentive to misrepresent her utility function,...

The very subject of giftedness is fraught with contradiction and controversy. On the one hand, we often encounter misunderstanding, envy, and perceived elitism—and on the other, admiration, dependency, and respect. Little wonder that our K–12 education system has not yet determined how best to nurture extraordinary individuals so that they can become extraordinary contributors to society—and fe...

Traditional incentive-compatible auctions for selling multiple goods to unconstrained and budgeted bidders can discriminate between bidders by selling identical goods at different prices. For this reason, A recent study by Feldman et al. dropped incentive compatibility and turned the attention to revenue maximizing envy-free item-pricing allocations for budgeted bidders. Envy-free allocations w...