It is a truism to say that forecasting political and economic trends continues tobe a booming business (Sherden 1997). Within academia, however, many still conceive of prediction as a less noble task than explanation. The wide range of attitudes, between attraction and skepticism, leveled at professional forecasters can even be found among those who have transformed forecasting from an obscuran...

Sigfried Kahn / Seligmann Kahn, Sieghaft schön und wohlgeeignet, einen Mann zu fesseln. Jüdische Ehevermittlung 1911 bis 1921 – Schadchen-Briefe aus dem „Copirbuch“. Transkribiert, eingeleitet kommentiert von Rainer Redies, mit einem Geleitwort Matthias Morgenstern (Tübinger Judaistische Studien, Bd. 5), Berlin: LIT-Verlag 2018. 160 S. ISBN 978-3-654-13888-0. € 29,90

Nash originated general non-cooperative game theory in seminal articles in the early 1950s by formally distinguishing between non-cooperative and cooperative models and by developing the concept of equilibrium for noncooperative games. Nash developed the first bargaining solution characterized by axioms, pioneered methods and criteria for relating cooperativetheory solution concepts and non-coo...

We establish a link between von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaini...

We consider a discrete-time insurance risk model, in which the financial risks constitute a stationary process with finite dimensional distributions of Farlie–Gumbel–Morgenstern type. We obtain an exact asymptotic formula for the ruin probability, reflecting the impact of this kind of association structure among the financial risks. r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors are bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. JEL Classification No.: C71, D71.

The concept of stability á la J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, which is composed of a pair of internal and external stability requirements, formalizes the idea of standard of behavior. This paper studies the decisiontheoretic foundation of stability, by establishing some epistemic conditions for a “stable” pattern of behavior in the context of strategic interaction. JEL Classification: C70, C...