Given that the assumption of perfect rationality is rarely met in the real world, we explore a graded notion of rationality in socioecological systems of networked actors. We parametrize an actors' rationality via their place in a social network and quantify system rationality via the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between the games Nash and logit quantal response equilibria. Previous work h...

This paper investigates learning in the Santa Fe (El Farol) bar problem (sfbp). It is argued that rationality together with belief-based learning (e.g., Bayesian updating) yields unstable behavior in this game. More specifically, two conditions normally sufficient for convergence to Nash equilibrium, namely rationality and predictivity, are shown to be incompatible. Low-rationality learning alg...

We show how standard learning rules can be interpreted as small departures from rationality in the context of an asset pricing model. We propose a distinction between ‘internal rationality’, as agents that maximize discounted expected utility under uncertainty given consistent beliefs about the future, and ‘external rationality’as agents that know perfectly the true stochastic process for funda...

In the first part of the paper (sec. 1-4), I argue that Elqayam and Evan's (2011) distinction between normative and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality corresponds to deontological vs. teleological accounts in meta-ethics. I suggest that Elqayam and Evans' distinction be replaced by the distinction between a-priori intuition-based vs. a-posteriori success-based accounts of cogniti...

Socio-ecological systems are increasingly modelled by games played on complex networks. While the concept of Nash equilibrium assumes perfect rationality, in reality players display heterogeneous bounded rationality. Here we present a topological model of bounded rationality in socio-ecological systems, using the rationality parameter of the Quantal Response Equilibrium. We argue that system ra...

the paper deals with kant's conception of moral judgment. i start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (korsgaard). according to this view, the logical inescapability of choo...

The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little effect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) v...