Inadequate access to credit remains a major constraint agricultural production in Africa. However, not all farmers face this difficulty. This article assesses the determinants of among rice who are members Ngoketunjia Cooperative Credit Union Northwest Region Cameroon. A structured pretested questionnaire was administered 126 randomly selected beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, whom study uni...

We analyze an oligopolistic microcredit market characterized by asymmetric information and institutions that can offer only one type of contract. We study the effects of competition on contract choice when small entrepreneurs can borrow from more than one institution due to the absence of credit bureaus. We show that appropriate contract design can eliminate the ex-ante incentives for multiple ...

The social development scene in Bangladesh is characterised by a strong presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The NGOs emerged following the war of liberation to help the communities in distress as part of post-war rehabilitation. Afterwards, with assistance from foreign donor agencies, they expanded their activities to deliver a variety of services including microcredit, essential...

The existing theoretical analysis of microfinance focuses on the nature loan contract such as group liability. We draw attention to role missing or imperfect labour markets in understanding some important “second generation” debates microfinance. Our helps explain a number puzzles including high repayment rates with interest rates, difficulties scaling up projects, limited economic impact borro...

This paper analyzes whether individuals who share risk have suboptimal demand for microinsurance due to a social dilemma. Even when individuals prefer to enroll as a group, they are tempted to free-ride on contributions from their peers and may fail to coordinate on their social optimum when insurance is offered at the individual level. A framed laboratory experiment in Tanzania, eliciting dema...

Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to e...